Fugitive Planning
When I first announced the (De-/Re-)Constructing Worlds project, I was insistent that the project would promote “dilettantisms” in order to counter “careerist imperialisms”. Taking my initial cues from Ivan Illich’s work, I identified the advance of careerist imperialisms with “the mushrooming of professional monopolies over production.” Pivoting now from Illich’s work to the work of Michel Foucault, I would like to introduce this dispatch by proposing that any imperialism that privileges optimizing powers over ruling, disciplinary, and normalizing powers is, by definition, a careerist imperialism.
Readers will recall that my last dispatch described how optimizing powers prevail over normalizing powers. I wrote that normalizing powers first create “at risk” populations, then optimizing powers compel “at risk” individuals to submit to special administration and supervision by modulating normalizing powers: lowering risks for those individuals who submit to special administration and supervision; heightening risks for those individuals who cannot or will not submit. In other words, I proposed that the formation of optimizing powers always involves the proliferation of special administrative and supervisory organs that serve to modulate normalizing powers. Going further along this line of flight, I would like to propose now that the proliferation of special administrative and supervisory organs always involves the proliferation of specialized professions and specialized knowledges in their service. Ipso facto, any imperialism that privileges optimizing powers must also privilege the proliferation of specialized professions, which is to say, in other words, that any imperialism that privileges optimizing powers is a careerist imperialism. Imperialist white-supremacist capitalist patriarchy, the imperialism of greatest concern to me, has become a careerist imperialism insofar as it has come to privilege optimizing powers in its currently prevailing neoliberal manifestations.
In and through taking up the problem of (re-)constructing convivial alternatives to administration and supervision, the present dispatch is concerned with finding ways to counter careerist imperialisms, in general, and, in particular, with finding ways to counter the currently prevailing careerist manifestations of imperialist white-supremacist capitalist patriarchy.
Convivial (Re-)Construction
I shall pick up where I left off at the end of my last dispatch. I spent most of my last dispatch pointing out that the members of “at risk” population groups are compelled by normalizing and optimizing powers to submit to special administration and supervision in order to lower the risks that they face. I left off the dispatch proposing that we who would counter power cannot and will not accept that submitting to special administration and supervision is a desirable solution for those “at risk”. But this proposition begged the question, “What alternatives to administration and supervision might we propose to members of ‘at risk’ population groups?”
Rather than submitting to administration and supervision, I propose that, whenever one finds oneself “at risk”, one may endeavor to engage in direct action and to defend direct action with due process, with the caveat being that one ought to prepare, execute, and evaluate every direct action with a mind for further direct action and every defense by due process with a mind for further defense by due process. To be more brief, I propose engaging in forms of direct action and in forms of defense by due process that are guided by forms of fugitive planning.
Many of us, myself included, will find this proposal daunting. Most of us feel trapped in circumstances that make taking direct action seem nigh impossible for us. We feel that we have no alternative but to submit to administration and supervision whenever we find ourselves “at risk”. This is because we have, in fact, been entrapped. Our present world of suffering furnishes us with numerous motives, means, and opportunities to submit to administration and supervision, but we search this world in vain for motives, means, and opportunities to live otherwise by engaging in forms of direct action, defense by due process, and fugitive planning. Personally, finding that I lack the motives, means, and opportunities to live otherwise, I regularly present myself to others as a Black man who is always ready, willing, and able to submit to administration and supervision. I am too afraid of becoming “just another unemployed Black man in America”, being subjected to hunger, homelessness, ruthless indebtedness, and murder, and having all of this framed by authorities as the unintended consequence of routine disciplinary action, as normal(ized) accident, and as the collateral damage of society’s pursuit of progressive optimization.
Indeed, recognizing the real and frightening difficulties here, I cannot simply propose that those “at risk” should engage in direct action, defense by due process, and fugitive planning. Indeed, the aim of the (De-/Re-)Constructing Worlds project is to do more than wag my finger and say “one should”. The aim is (i) to deconstruct some of the domineering statements, implements, and environments that are presently furnishing us with motives, means, and opportunities to submit to administration and supervision and (ii) to (re-)construct convivial statements, implements, and environments that furnish us with motives, means, and opportunities to live otherwise by engaging in forms of direct action, defense by due process, and fugitive planning.
Before getting to all that, however, I really ought to let you know what I mean when I use the terms “direct action”, “defense by due process”, and “fugitive planning”.
Direct Action
David Graeber defined direct action by marking the difference between direct action and protest.
[T]he difference between protest and direct action … [is that] protest, however militant, is an appeal to authorities to behave differently; [by contrast,] direct action is […] a matter of proceeding as one would if the existing structure of power did not exist. Direct action is, ultimately, the defiant insistence on acting as if one is already free.
Graeber's definition appeals to me a great deal, but I belive that it could be made more precise. To use my own clinical language here, I propose that engaging in direct action is not simply a matter of acting as if existing power formations do not exist but, rather, it is a matter of acting as if existing power formations are unstable and continuously (re-)negotiable as opposed to stable and non-negotiable.
Direct action never assumes that anyone has the power to rule, to discipline, to normalize, or to optimize. Much to the contrary, direct action always assumes that no power can rule, discipline, normalize, or optimize without its subjects’ consent, and it further assumes that consent is only ever given provisionally and may be withdrawn at a moments notice without instigating any retaliation from powers’ agents in response. It follows from this that a direct action must always involve a continuous consensus process — not a discrete consent form or a discrete polling forum, but a continuous conversation that (re-)negotiates a dissensus in consensus and a consensus in dissensus. Direct action that doesn’t make time for conversation as it proceeds is not really direct action, because direct action cannot proceed on the basis of an established command hierarchy. Those engaged in direct action are always engaged in making time for conversation. They know that conversation can never be a waste of time if there is ample time to converse; conversation can only ever be a waste of time when there is scarce time to converse.
With this clinical definition in mind, let us reconsider the difference between protest and direct action. As I read it, Graeber’s point is that those who protest are, in effect, insisting that ritualized spectacles, routine examinations, biased surveys, and/or variable controls have gained power over them without their consent. This is to say, in other words, that those who protest are reacting against what they believe to have power over them. Thus, power should be, and often is, flattered more than it is frightened by protest because protest is evidence that power doesn’t have to prove itself anymore, it is evidence that people believe that they must appeal to power.
Whereas a protest is a reaction that appeals to powers that may (or may not) be, a direct action is an enaction that exposes the powers that be for what they are. When we engage in direct action we insist that ritualized spectacles, routine examinations, biased surveys, and variable controls must prove that they have power over us. In so doing, we discover to what extent we are already free and precisely what freedoms we are lacking. Power should fear direct action more than protest because people engaged in direct action are demanding proof that power is what it claims to be. A power that has to prove itself is, by definition, a power that might fail to prove itself. Nay, more, a power that has to prove itself is a power that is failing, because a power diminishes itself every time it proves itself.
Protest on its own can only ever interpret the world; direct action challenges and changes the world. Protest is only ever coterminous with direct action when powers fear their own shadows, a situation which is not uncommon, and they endeavor to prohibit and punish protest because of this fear, turning protest into a rather curious form of direct action. In all other instances, protest is an idealist practice, an expression of ideology. Direct action, by contrast, is always an empiricist practice, an experiment in praxis.
Now, this is all very abstract, I know. But this is because each and every direct action must be a reflection of the particular needs and abilities of the actors involved. In lieu of a case study, I implore you to use your imaginations. Imagine, if you will, that you are at risk for hunger and homelessness. Are there forms of direct action that you might engage in with others so as to forage, cultivate, and fabricate your way out of hunger and homelessness? When asking yourself this question, don’t think of others in general but, rather, think of particular others with whom you might associate. As I see it, only particular assemblies of people can effectively plan, execute, and evaluate direct actions; general assemblies can effectively engage in protest and establish policies but they cannot effectively engage in direct action.
Defense by Due Process
Let’s say that we engage in direct action and that we face retaliation from a power formation: imprisonment, eviction, public censure, police brutality, and/or even murder. If the retaliation is enacted or overseen by a lower administrative and supervisory organ that is subject to review and regulation by higher administrative and supervisory organs, we (or our survivors) may defend our direct action with due process: we may appeal to the higher authority, and we may make the case that the lower authority overstepped in retaliating against us.
The defense by due process practiced by the direct activist is not the same as the defense by due process practiced by the rights activist. This practical difference is of great importance. The rights activist demands that human or civil rights are enshrined by higher authorities and respected by lower authorities, and the rights activist engages in direct action as a means to this end. The rights activist uses direct action to demonstrate that lower forms of administration and supervision are liable to overstep their authority, and then to make the case that higher authorities must be vigilant in reviewing and regulating lower authorities. The rights activist is not interested in direct action for itself but, rather, they are interested in whether and how direct action might initiate forms of due process that subject lower forms administration and supervision to review and regulation by higher forms of administration and supervision.
The direct activist, by contrast, is interested in direct action for itself. The direct activist holds that the goal of direct action is to defy administration and supervision and to demonstrate that direct action can be desirable and effective. The direct activist holds that direct action is both the means and the end. The direct activist engages in defense by due process if, and only if, they encounter retaliation from a lower administrative and supervisory organ upon engaging in direct action. If the direct activist encounters no such retaliation, they will simply continue to engage in direct action, and that is that. Going further, when engaging in defense by due process, the direct activist doesn’t really care to subject lower forms administration and supervision to higher forms of administration and supervision. Rather, when engaging in defense by due process, the direct activist is endeavoring to put higher and lower forms of administration and supervision into conflict with one another in such a way that they short circuit and cancel one another out. In other words, the direct activist is not appealing to higher forms of administration and supervision in order to restrain lower forms but, rather, they are engaging higher forms in order to sabotage lower forms and they are engaging lower forms in order to sabotage higher forms. According to the direct activist, the end result of defense by due process ought to be that neither higher forms nor lower forms of authority can effectively administer and supervise anyone any longer without their freely and continuously given consent.
I am taking my cues from Gilles Deleuze in this regard. Deleuze, in an interview with Claire Parnet, went so far as to identify jurisprudence with the defense of direct action, chiding those who concerned themselves exclusively with the defense of rights.
I mean, we say "human rights", but in the end, that's a party line for intellectuals, and for odious intellectuals, and for intellectuals without any ideas of their own. Right off the bat, I've noticed that these declarations of human rights are never done by way of the people that are primarily concerned.
[…] All of the abominations through which humans have suffered are cases. They're not denials of abstract rights; they're abominable cases. One can say that these cases resemble each other, have something in common, but they are situations for jurisprudence.
[…] [T]hose who are content to remind us of human rights, and recite lists of human rights — they are idiots. It's not a question of applying human rights. It is one of inventing jurisprudences where, in each case, this or that [abomination] will no longer be possible. And that's something quite different.
Those engaged in defining and defending rights often refuse to recognize due process in defense of direct action as a legitimate form of due process. Indeed, those who “manage” our existing assemblies for due process, our so-called justice systems, tend to believe that rights activism is the only kind of activism that can be defended by due process, and they decry due process in defense of direct action as a form corruption. Ivan Illich remarks upon this fact in Tools for Conviviality:
The use of [due process] for the purpose of hampering, stopping, and inverting [processes of administration and supervision] will appear to its managers and addicts as a misuse of the law and as subversion of the only order which they recognize. The use of [due process] to [defend direct action] appears corrupt and criminal to the bureaucrat, even one who calls himself a judge.
The rights activist is acceptable to the powers that be because the rights activist believes in the rule of law. The direct activist is unacceptable because the direct activist doesn’t believe in the rule of law but in direct action. To explain this, you may recall that direct action assumes that there can be no power to rule, discipline, normalize, or optimize without consent, and it further assumes that all consent is given provisionally and may be withdrawn at a moment’s notice. It follows from this that direct action assumes that there can be no rule of law without consent and that consent to the rule of law is only ever provisional and may be withdrawn at a moment’s notice; thus, to believe in direct action is not to believe in the sanctity of the rule of law but to believe in the need for a continuous consensus process.
Again, imagine that you are at risk for hunger and homelessness. Are there forms of direct action that you might engage in with others so as to forage, cultivate, and fabricate your way out of hunger and homelessness? Are these forms of direct actions prohibited and/or punishable? What forms of due process might enable you to skirt prohibitions and ward off punishments when engaging in direct action?
Fugitive Planning
Fugitive planning, as I understand it, is the way in which direct activists make sense of direct action and due process in defense of direct action.
In brief, fugitive planning means three things to me:
Fugitive planning means planning to defend direct action with due process whenever possible, because there is no sense in engaging in a direct action if we have yet to consider whether and how we might have recourse to defense by due process.
Fugitive planning means planning to follow every direct action with further direct action, because there is no sense in a direct action that doesn’t enable further direct action.
Fugitive planning means planning to follow every defense by due process with further defense by due process, because there is no sense in a defense by due process that doesn’t enable further defense by due process.
Imagine, once again, that you are at risk for hunger and homelessness. Are there forms of direct action that you might engage in with others so as to forage, cultivate, and fabricate your way out of hunger and homelessness? Which of these forms of direct action might enable further direct action? Are these enabling forms of direct actions prohibited and punishable? If so, are there any forms of defense by due process that might enable you to skirt prohibitions and ward off punishments while engaging in enabling forms of direct action? Which of these forms of defense by due process might enable further defense by due process?
Asking and answering the series of questions above constitutes an exemplary instance of fugitive planning.
Every instance of fugitive planning (and every fugitive planner) maintains that world-making ought to precede, exceed, and succeed any and all direct actions and defenses by due process. Indeed, another way to define fugitive planning would be to say that fugitive planning is a practice that aims to ensure that every direct action and every defense by due process somehow contributes to the making of worlds, to the making of statements, implements, and environments, that furnish us with motives, means, and opportunities for further direct actions and defenses by due process.
Earlier on, I had to distinguish direct action from protest and to distinguish due process in defense of direct action from due process in defense of rights. In a similar vein, I now have to distinguish fugitive planning from public policy. To this end, please allow me to cite a rather difficult passage from The Undercommons by Fred Moten and Stefano Harney.
Planning is self-sufficiency at the social level, and it reproduces in its experiment not just what it needs, life, but what it wants, life in difference […] Planning starts from the solidity, the continuity, and the rest of this social self-sufficiency, though it does not end there […] Planning begins […] with what we might call a militant preservation. And these are its means. Policy deputises those willing to, those who come to want to, break up these means as a way of controlling them, as once it was necessary to de-skill a worker in a factory by breaking up his means of production. And it does this by diagnosing the planners. Policy says that those who plan have something wrong with them, something deeply – ontologically – wrong with them. This is the first thrust of policy as dispersed, deputised command. What’s wrong with them? They won’t change. They won’t embrace change. They’ve lost hope. So say the policy deputies. They need to be given hope. They need to see that change is the only option. By change what the policy deputies mean is contingency, risk, flexibility, and adaptability to the groundless ground of the hollow capitalist subject, in the realm of automatic subjection that is capital. Policy is thus arrayed in the exclusive and exclusionary uniform/ity of contingency as imposed consensus, which both denies and at the very same time seeks to destroy the ongoing plans, the fugitive initiations, the black operations, of the multitude.
As resistance from above, policy is a new class phenomenon because the act of making policy for others, of pronouncing others as incorrect, is at the same time an audition for a post-fordist economy that deputies believe rewards those who embrace change but which, in reality, arrests them in contingency, flexibility, and […] administered precarity.
What are Moten and Harney getting at with all of this? Well, as I read them, they are pointing out that public policy endeavors to placate protestors and to facilitate due process in defense of rights. Fugitive planning, by contrast, endeavors to nurture direct activists and to facilitate due process in defense of direct action. Public policy, working against fugitive planning, aims to encourage members of “at risk” populations to engage in protest and rights activism and to discourage them from engaging in direct activism and fugitive planning. To this end, public policy pathologizes direct activists and fugitive planners for lacking faith in the rule of law and in the power of protest to shape public policy. For their part, self-conscious fugitive planners respond to this pathologization, “You want to oblige us to govern, to become complicit in our own subordination and extermination, to help you optimize ethnocide and ecocide. We won't yield to that pressure.”
I write this recalling years as protestor behind me, recalling my first ever protest as a teenager during the run up to the Iraq War. I write this with a hand bearing the scar of an encounter with a police baton received at the last protest that I ever attended, a march in Chicago against mass incarceration and for the rights of victims of police brutality from whom confessions had been extracted by torture. I write this with a heartfelt appreciation for the ways in which protest and rights activism can bring people together and ease their sufferings by shaping public policy. Yet I know from experience that, unless protests can gather a critical mass, the powers that be usually get to determine the pace and the terms that enable protests and rights activism to work, and I know that the powers that be always set the pace and the terms to effect optimal burnout in “at risk” populations. Indeed, I write this recalling the experience of burnout: I had to learn the hard way that more tends to be suffered than gained whenever one protests in support of a cause that lacks mass appeal and, even worse, whenever one dresses up one’s cause in the latest fashion in a bid for mass appeal. Ay, and I write in favor of direct action, defense by due process, and fugitive planning because these practices enable people to continuously and convivially (re-)negotiate the pace and the terms for their coming together and for the easing of their sufferings.
Coming Attractions
With all of the above in mind, my next few dispatches will return to the deconstruction of domineering statements: continuing the deconstruction of calendars and timestamps that I began in my dispatch on freeing time, as well as continuing the deconstruction of educational credentials and financial accounts that I began in my dispatch on convivial statements. I will also begin to deconstruct the professional resume and the criminal record. My initial and more limited aim in going about these deconstructions will be to investigate how these domineering statements are implicated in the workings of public policy that characterize the current careerist manifestations of imperialist white-supremacist capitalist patriarchy. My more far reaching aim will be to consider convivial statements that we may (re-)construct as alternatives to these domineering statements so as to motivate direct action, defense by due process, and fugitive planning.
